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I. INTRODUCTION
The unpredictable impact of deception1 on legal negotiations raises
critical problems for both practitioners and theorists. Practitioners find
that a single act of deception sometimes demolishes a negotiation, thereby
inflating the transactional costs to both parties?2 At other times, however,
a series of deceptions seems benign in their impact. For theorists, the
failure to explain satisfactorily the circumstances under which deception
causes a negotiation to fail threatens the legitimacy of legal negotiation as
* Steven Hartwell is Clinic Professor of Law at the University of San Diego. He
wishes to thank his colleagues Chris Wonnell and Larry Alexander for their useful
suggestions and especially Don Weckstein for his advice and encouragement.
1. By "deception," I mean all kinds of misleading verbal and non-verbal statements and
cues including what Irving Goffman called "barefaced lies," ones "for which there can be
unquestionable evidence that the teller knew he lied and willfully did so." I. GOFFMAN,
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Attempting a precise definition of
deception is problematic. Philosophers do not define deception uniformly. Grotius argued
that a false statement to a thief was not "lying" because no duty was owed. S. BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 15 (1978). John Stuart Mill argued that lying
to "barbarians" and children was permissible under a utilitarian morality. ON LIBERTY A.
Castell ed. 1947). Sissela Bok defines a lie as "an intentionally deceptive message in the
form of a statement." (emphasis in original) She employs "deception" to include even
unintended gestures, disguise and silence. S. BOK, supra, at 15. Studies have found that as
individuals mature, their concept of lying changes. One study found that young children
(five to nine years of age) tend to equate any factually untrue statement, including guesses,
with lies. Roughly 90% of the children in this study believed exaggeration to be a lie, but
only 50% of the adults. Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, Developmental Changes in Ideas
About Lying, 54 CHILD DEv. 1529 (1983). A recent academic writer has dispensed with a
formal definition of deception but analyzes language in terms of efficiency, that is, the
degree to which language optimizes the goals of the negotiation. He writes, "the truth of a
statement depends on the degree to which the statement supports the purpose of the activity
of which the statement was a part." Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 4, 13-20 (1987).
2. "The settlement of disputes in court is not only costly in terms of money, time and
emotions but the administration of justice would soon collapse from overload if the great
majority of disputes were not settled prior to court action." S. THURMAN & E. CHEATHAM,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 250 (1970).
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an academic discipline.3 Negotiation theorists have offered no theory that
distinguishes on a conceptual level harmful deception from the functionally
benign, nor have they advised practitioners how to recognize and deal
effectively with such deception.4 This Article offers both a theory to
academics and some practical guidance to practitioners.
A. Origin of the Article
Several years ago, when I first taught Legal Negotiation, I
observed as the semester progressed that my students became increasingly
more cooperative and truthful with each other in carrying out the sequence
of assigned simulated negotiations. After the semester ended, a student
informed me that he and his fellow students had agreed among themselves
in increasing numbers each week to share their negotiation "secret facts"5
in conscious disregard of the course instructions. They did so to reduce
the emotional stress they had experienced when they lied to their
opponents about their secret facts.
3. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO
ST. L.J. 41, 42 (1985) states "the absence of a comprehensive theory of negotiation
strategies currently jeopardizes the legitimacy of negotiation as an academic discipline . . .
instead legal negotiation theorists espouse directly conflicting advice." Id.
4. Legal negotiating has only recently been the object of academic study. Menkel-
Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J., 905-6 [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiations]. Few theories
have been offered to enable us to better understand the complexity of legal negotiation.
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754, 762 (1984) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View]. Much of what has been written about deception deals only with its ethical
aspects. See, e.g. L. KANOWITZ, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 68-75 (1986); R.
HAYDOCK, NEGOTIATION PRACTICE 195-213 (1984). Haydock writes:
Ethical considerations on lying in negotiations present a quandary for
lawyers. Considered opinions about the propriety of lying during
negotiations range from the position that a lawyer should never resort to
lies, to the position that certain situations may justify lies, to the position
that a lawyer must lie in some circumstances to protect client interests. Id.
at 205.
The following articles are essentially normative in addressing the ethical issues of
deception. Guernsey, Truthfidness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Hazard,
Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation To Be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing Parties, 33
S.C.L. REV. 181 (1981); Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by
Lawyers, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988); White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical
Limitations on Lying in Negotiations, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926 (1980); Comment,
The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Responsibility: Disclosure of Clients' Fraud in
Negotiation, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 419 (1983); Note, Private Settlement as Alternative
Adjudication: A Rationale for Negotiation Ethics, 18 J. L. REFORM 503 (1985).
The failure of legal scholarship to address the needs of practitioners has been often
noted. See, e.g. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures'
Phenomenon," 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 327 (1987).
5. For readers unfamiliar with clinical teaching, simulated negotiation problems
typically consist of a written scenario available to both parties plus one set of "secret facts"
for each party. The secret facts may limit that party's range of settlement or negotiation
strategy or otherwise place conditions on what that party may do.
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I was not only chagrined to learn that I had been the last to be let
in on this student secret but concerned that I had unwittingly taught a
negotiation model that bore little resemblance to the real world where
"secret facts" rarely come conveniently packaged for sharing and, when
they do, might well entail malpractice when shared.6 The following
semester, to dissuade my students from sharing their "secret facts," I
instituted a "scoreboard" which ranked each student competitively
according to his or her cumulative negotiation success. The scoreboard
fundamentally changed the dynamics of the class. The students no longer
deceived me by secretly sharing their information, but instead began to
deceive each other to improve their competitive standing on the
scoreboard.7 Sometimes, but not always, the deceptions they perpetrated
on each other led to acrimonious negotiation breakdowns.
Over the next several semesters, I tried to figure out what sorts of
deception led to negotiation breakdowns and what did not. I eventually
realized that the dynamic between a certain kind of deception and a
certain type of negotiator seemed to explain a disproportionate number of
these breakdowns. As explained in more detail later in this Article, I
found that deception about how one was negotiating (i.e., deceiving
cooperation while actually competing) was highly disruptive, especially
against students who strongly identified with a cooperative mode of
negotiating. I found that when students understood this dynamic, they
were better able to deal with deception and less likely to get entangled in
angry disputes over incidents of deception!
B. Ethics
This Article has little to say about deception from the perspective
of normative ethics. There are several reasons for this. Several writers,
most notably Eleanor Holmes Norton and Murray L. Schwartz, have
already written at length about the ethics of deception in a negotiation
6. Sharing a client's "secret information" could amount to a breach of contract with the
client, a breach of trust, malpractice or a breach of professional responsibility. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1981).
7. I think the scoreboard creates an educationally appropriate level of classroom
competition, similar to the level students will encounter in practice. Although the scoreboard
is prominently posted in the classroom, grades are not dependent upon scoreboard success.
Tying course grades to negotiation success would, in my opinion, create an excessively
competitive atmosphere that would be educationally dysfunctional. I agree with Professor
Menkel-Meadow, who, among others, has criticized the practice of tying student grades to
their negotiation success on the grounds that the practice over-emphasizes the competitive
and adversarial aspects of negotiation. Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiations, supra note 4.
8. An operative premise of this Article is that to understand a process, such as
deception, is to gain a measure of control over it. When students and practitioners
understand how the game of deception functions, they are free to play or not. P.
WATZLAWICK, J. WEAKLAND & R. FISCH, CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM FORMATION
AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION 100 (1974) [hereinafter P. WATZLAWICK].
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context. 9  Given that negotiation theory is still in its early stages of
development, separating the descriptive from the prescriptive may enhance
our understanding of the negotiation process.1 °  In my teaching
experience, I have found that students ignore ethical norms during the
heat of a negotiation." The approach taken here might be best described
as "functionalist," an analytical approach that focuses on how conduct
impedes a process in attaining its goals.' 2 The fundamental goal of the
negotiation process is typically the exchange of promises that will improve
each negotiator's current position. I assume this goal to be ethically
desirable.U From a functionalist perspective, deceptive conduct becomes
problematic only when it disrupts the process of a negotiation in reaching
or carrying out that goal.'4
I acknowledge that a functionalist approach appears ethically weak
because it condones non-disruptive deception. Most of us have been
taught at our mother's knee, if not at Immanuel Kant's, that lying is an
intrinsically immoral act. A perspective that condones even some
9. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV.
669 (1978). Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton has recently explored the inadequacy of ethics
to respond to deceptive negotiation tactics. Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (1989).
10. Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation, supra note 4, at 928.
11. In a similar vein, Professor Howard Raiffa writes:
Most of the subjects in our experiments [students participating in simulated
negotiations] had had some education in normative ethics. They had at
least read excerpts from the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine,
Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Bentham, Mill and others concerning normative
principles of right and wrong. But knowing the distinctions between
teleological (result-oriented) and deontological (duty-oriented) frameworks
or between monistic and pluralistic frameworks of normative ethics may
not help a subject to decide as the City representative negotiating with
AMPO whether, in the case of Daniels, to lie or be quietly misleading or
to be open and honest. Normative ethical frameworks are not designed to
yield definitive decision procedures, and we should not expect answers
from these philosophical teachings and reflections. H. RAIFFA, THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 344 (1982).
12. Norton, supra note 9, at 525.
13. Negotiation is (at least) presumptively ethical because it is universally accepted and
pervasively practiced in some form throughout the world. Norton, supra note 9, at 505.
Except in unusual instances, parties enter a negotiation voluntarily and do so because they
believe that it is in their best interests. HAYDOCK, supra note 4, at 17. When an actual
dispute has arisen, the parties presumptively have an alternative to negotiation through the
court process. Weaker parties may be better off negotiating. The commonly held assumption
that formal adjudication procedures provide the weaker parties in a dispute more protection
is challenged in Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach about Legal Process,
34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 268, 271-73 (1984).
14. A settlement is more just when the negotiators are fully informed. Deception is
dysfunctional in reaching this goal to the degree deception leaves the negotiators less than
fully informed on issues relevant to the negotiation subject matter. Condlin, "Cases on Both
Sides": Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REV. 65, 133
(1985); Peters, supra note 1, at 37-41. A negotiation typically entails the exchange of
promises regarding future conduct. A deception that dissuades a party from willingly
carrying out its promises is dysfunctional.
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deception must appear to some readers as morally suspect. Part II of this
paper therefore attempts a fresh understanding of negotiation deception by
examining the role of deception in the natural world of butterflies, birds,
and dogs. The notion I wish to put forward is that negotiation and
deception are fundamental to all life, and that at least some of the
difficulty human negotiators encounter with deception is a product of their
maladaptive formal education. I do not intend to prove the moral
neutrality of deception, but only to suggest that deception is not the fruit
of human wickedness but a rational response to competition."5 Part III
then introduces the notion of contextual deception as a uniquely human
mode of deception, a mode with an extraordinary capacity to disrupt a
negotiation. Excerpts from several negotiation dialogues that illustrate
contextual deception are analyzed in the Appendices. Finally, Part IV
suggests how negotiators can learn to respond more effectively to
incidents of contextual deception. Part IV also describes how contextual
deception differs in its impact upon various negotiators depending upon
certain identifiable personality characteristics. Part IV closes by
suggesting how embarrassment and shame may be useful guides in helping
negotiators distinguish between benign deception and harmful contextual
deception.
If. DECEPTION IN THE NATURAL WORLD
Many creatures engage in deception, typically to escape predators.
One simple example of this deception is camouflage. Virtually all fish are
dark on top and light underneath so that predators approaching from
below, where fish are most vulnerable, will confuse the light underside
with the water's surface.1 6 Insects may appear to be an inedible leaf or
twig to fool a predator bird.17 A more complex and instructive example
of deceptive camouflage is presented by three different families of
butterflies known as "mimetics" because they mime each other in
appearance."
15. The dangers of constructing moral systems from nature have been amply
documented by Stephen Jay Gould. See GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981)
(debunking "scientific" justifications for racism and sexism); GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE:
THE BURGESs SHALE AND THE NATURE OF HISTORY (1989) (showing how Darwin's theory
of natural selection was made to demonstrate the existence of God and the perfectibility of
mankind) [hereinafter GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE]. The point I wish to make is that
deception exists everywhere in nature and pre-exists humankind.
16. Land animals, such as deer, are dark on top and light underneath for much the
same reason: when standing, the sun lightens the dark top while shading the light underside
so that the animal tends to merge visually into the background. A. HARDY, THE LIVING
STREAM: EVOLUTION AND MAN 127-30 (1965).
17. Id. at 125-31.
18. Id. at 143-56. The California Academy of Sciences in San Francisco's Golden Gate
Park features a lovely display of Batesian and Mullerian mimetic butterflies.
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A. Mullerians and Batesians
Members of two of these mimetic families have a distinctly
noxious taste such that predator birds, having once tasted any one
member, avoid members of both families. These two families, known
among lepidopterists as "Mullerians," cooperate in collectively warning
birds by their common appearance. Birds only need to recognize the
appearance of one family to avoid what are in fact two different families
of noxious-tasting butterflies. As a result of their cooperative appearance,
fewer Mullerians are sacrificed in educating each new generation of
hungry birds.19
The third mimetic butterfly family is not noxious to predator birds
but is quite tasty. However, should a predator bird taste a noxious
Mullerian first, it will thereafter avoid members of this tasty third family
because it has been deceived by their appearance, believing that they are
noxious Mullerians. Members of this family of deceivers, known as
"Batesian" mimetics, can be said to use deception in competing with the
Mullerians and predator birds in negotiating their (Batesian) survival. 2
1. The Source of the Deception. Of course this cooperative truth-
telling and competitive deception is quite innocent and free of moral
impropriety because the Mullerians and Batesians are not conscious of
their appearance or its effect on predator birds. Butterflies (we presume)
lack the intentionality that we ordinarily identify as necessary for moral
choice. However, the more significant observation is that neither
Mullerians nor Batesians have any control -- intended or unintended --
over their distinctive appearance. The creative power that shapes their
mimicry resides in the selective eating habits of the predator birds. 2
Once the birds recognize the appearance common to both Mullerians and
Batesians, they pursue only those Mullerians (to their disgust) or Batesians
(to their pleasure) that deviate from the protective norm set by the
majority of Mullerians and Batesians.
The end result of the selective eating habits of the birds is that
those deceptive Batesians (and truthful Mullerians) that most resemble
their collective norm survive to reproduce another generation of mimetics.
19. Id. at 144-46.
20. The deceptive Batesian mimetic might be "compared to an unscrupulous tradesman
who copies the advertisement of a successful firm, whereas Mullerian mimicry is like a
combination between firms who adopt a common advertisement to share expenses." Hardy,
Yupra note 16, at 145-46.
21. Hardy, supra note 16, at 148-50, 152. Writing from the perspective of behaviorism
?sychology, B. F. Skinner observed, "Whatever we do, and hence however we perceive it,
lhe fact remains that it is the environment which acts upon the perceiving person, not the




Deceptive Batesians have their deceptive appearance forced upon them, so
to speak, by birds that unwittingly cull out those Batesians who fail to
deceive well. Were the birds capable of attributing blame, they would
have only themselves to blame for Batesian deception. The natural world
suggests that human negotiators who "bite" at the deception of "Batesian"
negotiators may have a hand in shaping the very deception about which
they complain.
2. Mullerian Cooperation and Batesian Competition. On the one
hand, Mullerians seem to cooperate not only among themselves but
between themselves and predator birds. It is in the cooperative best
interests of both birds and Mullerians that the Mullerians be totally candid
in accurately advertising their noxious taste, for as a Mullerian's
appearance deviates from the norm, it runs a greater risk of getting eaten
to the detriment of both butterfly and bird. On the other hand, the
relationship between tasty Batesians and birds seems to be one of
competition. The Batesians are like small businesses seeking to retain an
economic foothold amidst the forces of large bird-conglomerates who are
out, literally, to eat them up. To survive, the Batesians must disguise
their assets, so to speak, so that their predators are deceived into leaving
them alone. From a purely causal perspective, the cooperative Mullerian
context seems to reward honesty just as the competitive Batesian context
rewards deception. Deception seems most useful to weak parties who
need to protect their assets from stronger parties.2
3. The Relationship Between Mullerians and Batesians. Initially it
would appear that Mullerians and Batesians are in competition, for as the
Batesians succeed in deceiving the birds, their numbers increase, making
it increasingly less likely that birds will be fooled by their ruse. As the
birds are rewarded for successfully catching Batesians, they are more
likely to go after Mullerians, mistaking them for Batesians. Deceivers
impair the credibility of non-deceivers.
Yet, an odd form of cooperation exists between Mullerians and
Batesians. Were the Mullerians to disappear, deceptive Batesians would
be at greater risk. Batesians can only deceive in the presence of a greater
22. Like mimetic butterflies, negotiators need not act consciously in order to deceive.
When a thoughtless deceptive tactic works (e.g., a simple thoughtless exaggeration of a
claim) the deceiving negotiator has learned by operant conditioning to repeat the tactic given
a similar situation. The deceived negotiator has, in failing to recognize the deception,
participated in shaping the very deception about which he may later complain. Kennedy,
Reinforcement Frequency, Task Characteristics and Interval of Awareness Assessment as
Factors in Verbal Conditioning Without Awareness, 88 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 103(1971).
23. Strong parties can afford to tell the truth; parties with no assets have no reason to
deceive.
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number of non-deceptive Mullerians. The very survival of Batesians
depends upon the continued well-being of the honest Mullerians, a well-
being the Batesians undercut by their deception.
The Mullerian need for Batesians is less obvious. Like honest
cooperators everywhere, the Mullerians must wish that deceptive Batesians
would take their business elsewhere. Unfortunately, life is never that
simple. Batesians do "cooperate," albeit unintentionally, in keeping their
numbers low, because as Batesian numbers increase, both Batesians and
Mullerians are at greater risk. The greater the incidence of deception, the
less its power to deceive. Were Batesians to somehow disappear
catastrophically, then some other creature would eventually evolve to fill
the niche presently played by the Batesians, perhaps presenting a far
greater threat than the perfidious Batesians.Y Manageable, relatively
innocuous deception may protect Mullerians from worse situations."
Might manageable deception among negotiators serve a similar function?
Were such deception to disappear overnight, might negotiators become
naive and vulnerable to some catastrophic deception?, 6
B. The Origin of Deception
Batesian butterflies are not alone in having their camouflaged
appearance created by the action of their predators. The origin of natural
deceptive camouflage and deceptive behavior is found in every case in the
hunting pattern of the predator who rewards the successful deceivers by
permitting them to survive and propagate. Deception does not require
conscious choice or moral judgment. The origin of deception, then, is not
found in the fall of man as conscious beings, but in nature herself. It is a
24. Only Batesian and Mullerian females are mimetic. If Batesian males were mimetic,
then Mullerian females might unwittingly mate with them (producing no offspring): a far
greater threat to Mullerian survival than that caused by the present loss of the
uncamouflaged males. Hardy, supra note 16, at 148-49.
25. The effect of catastrophic changes in one species upon other species is chaotic and
unpredictable. May, Simple Mathematical Models with Very Complicated Dynamics, 261
NATURE 459 (1976). See also, GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE, supra note 15, at 305-8.
26. Governments in free societies lie to the public, but the public is not required to
believe the lie. Proponents of utopian models of society, such as traditional Marxist models,
claim to abolish deception. Watzlawick, supra note 8, at 47-61. Governments in totalitarian
societies therefore never (officially) deceive. Their citizens are punished if they do not
believe their lies. Id. at 68. The thought is not new. Plato's Athenian says:
[A]ssuming you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will
be the law forbidding any young man to enquire which of them are right
or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree that the
laws are all good, for they come from God; and any one who says the
contrary is not to be listened to. PLATO, LAWS I (B. Jowett trans. 1901).
The extraordinary damage to the human psyche caused by this latter form of
deception, in which the fact of deception must itself be denied, has been described with great
poignancy in A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (1941).
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peculiarly arrogant form of human egocentricity to arrogate deception to
human invention." This is not to say that the world of human deception
is no different from deception in the natural world. Human beings are
conscious beings who can choose to deceive or not. However, much
human conduct is simply habit or action taken with little or no conscious
reflection. Deception is best understood, at least initially, in the same
way that all non-human behavior is understood, as a causal response to
the environment?2 When the environment rewards an organism for
certain behavior, that organism, whether it is a bird, a white rat, or a
human being, is more likely to repeat that behavior than not. Under
conditions of competition, nature typically rewards and thereby encourages
deception in people as well as in butterflies and birds.
C. Bridging Natural and Human Deception
A bridge between the worlds of natural and human deception is
formed by intelligent animals that share some of the characteristics of both
worlds, such as the domesticated dog. In a once commonly performed
laboratory experiment, a dog is strapped down to a laboratory cot so that
its movements are restrained. The dog is then shown different stimuli,
such as a circle and an ellipse. Through simple operant conditioning, the
dog learns to differentiate between the two shapes. For example, the dog
may be rewarded with food if it barks when shown the circle but
electrically shocked if it barks when shown the ellipse. Once the dog has
learned to differentiate between the shapes, the experimenter makes the
dog's task more difficult by progressively flattening the circle and
rounding the ellipse. As the difference between the two shapes lessens
(that is, as their distinctive shapes are camouflaged), the dog begins to
exhibit signs of stress. At the point when the dog can no longer
27. The belief that we humans invented lying and deception is deeply ingrained in the
Christian ethic. Elaine Pagels explores how the medieval church established the orthodoxy
that mankind brought pain, oppression and death - as well as deception- upon itself
through free choice in E. PAGELS, ADAM, EVE AND THE SERPENT 127-50 (1988).
28. Behaviorism psychology understands human behavior as entirely causal. Its best
known proponent, B. F. Skinner, states "As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of
physics and biology, the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been
attributed is replaced by the environment - the environment in which the species evolved
and in which the behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained." B. F. SKINNER,
supra note 21, at 175. Indeed, from the perspective of traditional psychology, the existence
of one's volitional choice to deceive is extremely problematic as traditional psychology
understands all behavior as caused, not freely chosen. See HOWARD & CONWAY, Can There
Be an Empirical Science of Volitional Action?, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1241 (1986).
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differentiate between the two shapes, it may engage in bizarre behavior
such as biting, refusing food, defecating, or becoming comatose. 9
What explains the dog's bizarre behavior? The traditional
psychological explanation is that the dog's capacity to discriminate has
broken down.30  Yet, the example of the birds confronting mimetic
butterflies, as well as the lives of ordinary dogs under natural conditions,
suggest this explanation is unsound. When birds and dogs confront
ambiguous information under natural conditions, their capacity to
discriminate does not break down -- they simply make guesses. The
dog's bizarre behavior has to do with a deception of context. The
neurotic dog's "problem" is not that it has been deceived about a shape,
but that it has been deceived about a context -- a deception the dog
experiences as much more traumatic than deception within a context. The
next Part describes what is meant by contextual deception.
III. CONTEXTUAL DECEPTION
A context is a system for interpreting the meaning of stimuli or
information.3' Simple creatures, such as butterflies and birds, interpret
information in only one way, by the contextual system that is hard-wired
into their brains.3 2  They are incapable of learning new contexts. More
complex creatures, such as dogs, dolphins, chimpanzees, and people, can
learn different ways or contexts within which to interpret the meaning of
information.3 Dogs, for example, naturally learn the context of "play" in
which certain gestures that might be threatening in a "fight" context are
29. This experiment was originally conducted by Ivan Pavlov and replicated by other
experimenters with different animals and different settings. See SARGENT & STAFFORD,
BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE GREAT PSYCHOLOGISTS 206-7 (1965). See also Watzlawick,
supra note 8, at 216.
30. G. BATESON, MIND AND NATURE: A NECESSARY UNITY 118-21 (1979). Pavlov
and later investigators equated the breakdown in discrimination as equivalent to a neurosis.
SARGENT & STAFFORD, supra note 29, at 207.
31. D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 161-64
(1980); M. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 207-8 (1986).
32. "Without context, words and actions have no meaning at all. This is true not only
of human communication in words but also of all communication whatsoever, of all mental
process, of all mind, including that which tells the sea anemone how to grow and the
amoeba what he should do next." BATESON, supra note 30, at 15.
33. Id. at 122-23. Bateson's dolphins learned to create new contexts. They were
rewarded not for repeating a learned behavior (learning within a context) but for performing
a behavior they had never before performed (learning a new context). To do this, the
dolphins had to learn that what was sought by the human experimenters was a "mistake




interpreted as non-threatening. 4 In natural settings, dogs exhibit a third
context we might call "exploration." Watching a dog run along freely in
the countryside is to see the context of exploration at work. Dogs sniff,
investigate, and get surprised. They are deceived into thinking that a
fallen tree limb is a snake and that every rustle in the leaves is a rabbit to
be chased. Dogs in natural settings suffer no anxiety and exhibit no
bizarre behavior when they are deceived by ambiguous, camouflaged
information because they have a context available that permits mistakes. s
In the laboratory, the dog learns an "unnatural" context, one that
we might call a "discrimination required/no mistake" context. Through an
artificial system of rewards and shocks administered to the dog under
severe duress as it lies strapped to a laboratory cot, the dog learns to
anticipate making a mistake-free discrimination and to avoid making a
guess. When discrimination is impossible because the shapes are identical
the dog's reaction is violent because it has been deceived by a context.
As noted in more detail later in this Article, being deceived about a
context is qualitatively worse than being deceived within a context.36
The above-described laboratory experiment would never work with
butterflies or birds because they lack the necessary intelligence to learn a
new context. A butterfly or bird cannot be taught a context that demands
positive discrimination and forbids guesses. 37  The experiment works with
dogs because they are capable of learning (some) new contexts. It works
even better with human beings who are capable of learning a multitude of
contexts, a capability that is, I suggest, at the root of their difficulty with
contextual deception.3t
34. "[Elven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." 0. W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1938). "In ordinary parlance, 'play' is not the name of an
act or action; it is the name of a frame for action." Bateson, supra note 30, at 139 [emphasis
in original].
35. "[E]xploration is self-validating, whether the outcome is pleasant or unpleasant for
the explorer. If you try to teach a rat to not-explore by having him poke his nose into boxes
containing electric shock, he! will . . .go on doing this, presumably needing to know which
boxes are safe and which unsafe. In this sense, exploration is always a success." Bateson,
supra note 30, at 139.
36. Id. at 119-20.
37. Simple creatures have only a single hard-wired system for interpreting information -
- a system that is transmitted by their genes. However, the perceived distinction between
"genetic learning" through natural selection and ordinary adaptive learning is not as great as
once thotight. Through natural selection, organisms establish new contextual interpretive
systems in adapting more effectively to a changed environment. J. MONOD, CHANCE AND
NECESSITY 152-53 (1973).
38. Humans may share this capacity to deceive about contexts with chimpanzees. A
low-ranking male chimp may act as if he were injured around a higher ranking male to
avoid an attack or he may casually wander off in the general direction of a female to whom
he has secretly given sexual cues to avoid the interference of higher ranking males. In both
cases, the low-ranking male is faking the context of "cooperation" while engaging in
"competition." F. DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES 47-50
(1989).
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A. Environmental Cues to Context
Ordinarily, the environment itself cues people to the appropriate
context for decoding information. When I hear a trilled "r" accompanied
by bodily gestures characteristic of latin culture, I know to "decode" the
sounds I hear as Spanish. When I enter a theater, environmental cues
such as the stage and the seating tell me that the action to follow is
"theater." The words "once upon a time" cue a child that what follows is
merely a story. We can, of course, make mistakes about context. The
language I hear may be Portuguese, not Spanish. Modem theater
sometimes plays with context, having actors step out of the theater
audience so that the theater context does not tell us for sure whether they
are actors or not. Although becoming socialized within a culture entails
the ability to quickly and accurately identify social contexts, we all
occasionally misidentify contexts even within cultures we know very well.
Most all of us have experienced the jitters while attending an unfamiliar
social occasion because we fear we will misunderstand or be
misunderstood.
Context can clarify an otherwise ambiguous conversation.
Consider, for example, over-hearing this simple statement: "John shot
two bucks."39 The first necessary contextual decision is that the language
is English and that the sentence should be understood according to the
rules of the English language. Without any other contextual markers, the
sentence might mean that John shot a gun and struck two deer or that
John gambled away two dollars. Context would ordinarily be provided by
our knowledge of John (he is a renowned hunter), the speaker (she is only
interested in gambling), the general subject matter of the conversation
(they have been talking all morning about hunting) or perhaps the location
(they are at a casino). In the same manner, negotiation styles or contexts
serve as contextual markers that help us identify the probability that
certain statements are intended as deceptive.
B. Negotiation Contexts
"Negotiation" is the name of a context and, as well, the name of a
set of contexts. When two opposing attorneys meet on the courthouse
steps just before trial, the environment cues them that what they say in the
next few minutes should be interpreted as within the context "negotiation."
Only a naive attorney would interpret the greetings, inquiries about
parking problems, and other such topics as merely conversation within the
context of polite social intercourse. Negotiation, however, is a complex
39. See MINSKY, supra note 31, at 208.
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context containing within it several different contexts. The meaning of
certain words or gestures in one of these contexts may differ from their
meaning in another context. The context of a "courthouse steps"
negotiation differs from the collegial "office" context of negotiating among
one's peers within a law firm or law school faculty. The contextual
interpretation of "deception" in one such context may differ from the
contextual interpretation in another." Environmental cues and the
language employed guide us in the appropriate interpretation of deceptive
language and conduct. In order to understand better how these deceptions
are interpreted, we need to review briefly the three major contexts that
constitute most negotiations.
Professor Thomas Gifford has recently offered a comprehensive
typology of negotiation contexts. 4' His typology identifies three explicit
contexts: competition, cooperation and integration (often called
"collaboration"). The first context, competition,' is marked by high
demands, limited disclosure of information, threats, apparent commitments
to positions, and deception.n Asserted opening demands, bottom lines,
constraints on authority to bargain, the identity of one's principal, and the
seriousness of threats should all be taken as potentially deceptive." For
40. For example, the differing contexts of "confidential" and "nonconfidential"
apparently cue faculty to deceive differently on student letters of recommendation. When
advised that a student's letter of recommendation to a graduate school would be confidential,
faculty were found to write less favorable (more candid perhaps) letters than when advised
that the letter would be nonconfidential and made available to the student (more deceptive
perhaps). Ceci & Peters, Letters of Reference: A Naturalistic Study of the Effects of
Confidentiality, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 29 (1984).
41. Gifford, supra note 3, at 45-48. Gifford calls "strategies" what I call "contexts."
He distinguishes a negotiation strategy that describes a set of behaviors in response to a
particular negotiaton problem from a negotiation style that describes an individual
negotiator's general disposition toward any negotiation. While accepting the usefulness of
this distinction, I have observed that for many students, their strategy is subsumed into their
style. See infra text accompanying notes 65, 69, and 74.
42. Gifford, supra note 3, at 48-52.
43. One might think that litigation or the threat of litigation would constrain deception
in a competitive negotiation. As legal rules provide the party's substantive entitlements and
thereby provide the bargaining chips for negotiation, negotiators presumably would not stray
too far from the discoverable truth. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). However, observations of
simulated negotiations of third-year law students and limited observations of practitioners
indicate that they typically do not construct their negotiation strategies around a litigation
model, that is, they do not negotiate as if the dispute were to be litigated. Condlin, supra
note 14, at 65. Indeed, most disputes are settled by negotiation before they ever reach the
filing stage of litigation. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 27 (1983). Nonetheless, the adversarial model of litigation appears
to predispose legal negotiators to assume at least initially a competitive stance. Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 4, at 765-66.
44. The acceptable limits to deception appear to be set by local practice, except
perhaps, at the extreme. Professor Norton states that permitting a plaintiff to wear a neck
brace to a negotiation when the plaintiff has suffered no such injury is always "unethical and
probably illegal," Norton, supra note 9, at 506-7, but notes that a negotiator who fails to
deceive on his bottom line has turned the negotiation into a sale. Id. at 514.
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example, a statement by one negotiator that "One million dollars is the
least we will accept to settle this case" should, given a competitive
context, be interpreted as a high demand and a probable deception. The
opponent would undoubtedly err if he were to interpret this statement as a
candid offer.
The characteristic pattern that identifies the second context,
cooperation, 45 is the pattern of alternating and sequential concessions
directed toward a compromise. Each party typically opens with offers
that are less than what they expect at a final settlement. Given the above
statement in a cooperative context, the opponent should interpret it as a
signal inviting a counter-offer with the expectation that the opponent will
then make a lesser demand. The speaker does not intend to deceive as he
might in a competitive context, 46 but intends that the statement encourage
a sequence of concessions in which he himself intends continued
participation." Plea bargaining between experienced prosecutors and
defense counsel typically follows a cooperative context.
With the third context, integration,8 the negotiators engage in
problem solving to satisfy their common interests. Given the "one million
dollar" statement, the opponent should interpret it as candid, and designed
to help both negotiators resolve their common problem. The two
negotiators may have, for example, two million dollars to resolve a
certain problem. The speaker does not intend to deceive or to induce a
counter-offer. Integration differs from cooperation in several respects.
Cooperation typically presumes a zero-sum situation in which your gain is
my loss. The pattern of sequential concessions is intended to reach a fair
division of a fixed pie. 49 Integration typically presumes a non-zero sum
situation, that is, a situation in which the pie can be made larger or in
which the parties can abandon the original pie and, by working together,
construct a new and tastier pie.
45. Gifford, supra note 41, at 52-54.
46. It is problematic when, if ever, a negotiator "intends" a deception in a competitive
context if we assume that the negotiator presumes his opponent is not deceived.
47. Within a cooperative context, deception about preferences are typically permitted
(how much money you want for the car) but not deception about external facts (whether the
car's rings are worn out). Peters, supra note 1, at 38.
48. Gifford, supra note 3, at 54-57. The nomenclature for describing various types of
negotiation is not settled. Integration is sometimes called collaboration, but is more often
confused in literature with cooperation.
49. This "fair division" is more accurately called "splitting the difference" because the
two negotiators typically reach a half-way point between their initial contending offers. The
fairness of this process has often been criticized as unprincipled. Yet students, and - from
my experience as an attorney -- practitioners, often cannot settle a negotiation because they
are unable to split the last dollar in a dispute. For a brief discussion and sources, see
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 4, at 921 n. 69.
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C. Deception of Context
A major thesis of this paper is that the kind of deception that
threatens a negotiation is a deception about a context and not a deception
within a context. As long as each negotiator accurately identifies the
negotiation strategy (that is, the negotiation context) of the other, and
appropriately anticipates the kind of candidness and deception which that
negotiation context entails, deception will not derail the negotiation. If,
for example, both negotiators knowingly employ a competitive context,
then each will interpret the other's statements as presumptively
deceptive. 5  A negotiator who understands the negotiation context as
competitive cannot rationally walk out of a competitive negotiation in a
rage over a deception.:" Similarly, if both negotiators knowingly engage
in a integratively-contexted negotiation, neither should ever intentionally
deceive the other because it is not in their own self-interests to do so.'
However, negotiations are complex events and negotiators sometimes
misread the context of a negotiation and consequently misinterpret the
language of their opponents.3 At other times, negotiators act irrationally
by refusing to recognize a patently obvious context, a type of negotiation
pathology explained in Part IV.
1. Why We React More Strongly to Deception of Context. Good
reasons compel negotiators to react more strongly to deception about a
context than to deception within a context. Deception about context is
50. The detection of a deception may cue the astute negotiator that his opponent is
engaged in competitive negotiating. In revealing the opponent's competitive context, the
opponent's false statement may convey more information to the astute negotiator than if the
statement had been true (i.e., knowing someone is lying may be more important than the
truth of any individual statement). F. DRETSKE, KNOWLEDGE AND THE FLOW OF
INFORMATION 44 (1981).
51. Unless, of course, the walk-out is a competitive tactic!
52. Socrates taught that virtue is knowledge. "Socrates believed all the virtues to be
forms of knowledge, so that to know justice entails being just; for once we have learnt
geometry and architecture we are geometers and architects." ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN
ETHICS, Book 1, Ch. 5, 1216b 7. Only when people understand what they are doing are
they free to act rationally. "We suggest that among socio-economic theories, Marxian
theory, for example, failed at least partly because certain ruling class members, when they
became aware of the theory, saw that it was in their interest to disobey it." N. HOWARD,
PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 64
(1971). Hence, an understanding of the theory of deceptive contexts assists a negotiator in a
("rationally") integrative negotiation context in acting rationally. An "integrative" negotiator
is honest in an integrative context because she knows that honesty is rational within that
context. Gordon, Private Settlement as Alternative Adjudication: A Rationale for
Negotiation Ethics, 18 J. LAV REFORM 503, 506 (1985). When such rational behavior is
socially reinforced, it becomes "moral behavior." Gewirtz, Mechanisms of Social Learning:
Some Roles of Simulations and Behavior in Early Human Development, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH (1969).
53. Packer, The Structure of Moral Action: A Hermeneutic Study of Moral Conflict, in
CONTRIBUTIONS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1985).
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potentially much more harmful than deception within a context. To be
deceived about a context is to misinterpret every piece of information
within that context. Consider the feeling of discovering that a person
whom we thought to be a friend (that is, a person within a "friend
context") has, from the very beginning, been a false friend. This sudden
realization means that we have misunderstood everything this person has
said to us. We have been deceived not once but numerous times. We
may feel painfully humiliated. The difference between deception within a
context and deception about a context is the difference between merely
falling short and betrayal, between Peter and Judas. 4
2. Embarrassment and Shame. We intuitively express the
difference between deception within a context and deception about a
context with the social concepts of embarrassment and shame. s
Embarrassment is always context dependent. s6 What is embarrassing in
one context (belching in the faculty dining room, a deception in an
integrative negotiation context) may not be embarrassing somewhere else
(belching at home in front of one's long suffering family, a deception in a
competitive negotiation context).0 Embarrassment is a negotiator's typical
reaction to being caught in an inadvertent deception within a context that
does not permit deception, such as a deception within an integrative
context. Someone is embarrassed because he has not acted consistently
with the context he wishes to project."8 The deceiver's embarrassment
(flushed face, stammering) signals his opponent that he did not mean to
deceive (that is, that he momentarily and inadvertently slipped from his
role as an integrative negotiator). Sometimes negotiators are embarrassed
when they discover they have been deceived because the deception
indicates that they have not been the astute, sophisticated negotiators they
thought themselves to be.
3. Shame. In contrast to embarrassment, shame typically entails
intentional deception about a context. Shame is not being the person one
54. Matthew 26 & 27. Peter, in his acute embarrassment, wept. Judas, in lis shame,
hung himself. The sense of betrayal is strongly suggested by the Losing Team members in
the context deception set forth in Appendix 1.
55. Babcock, Embarrassment: Window on the Self, 18 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAv. 461(1988).
56. Stated differently, we feel embarrassed about misconduct within a context.
57. Babcock, supra note 55, at 462.
58. He has issued a message (a message of deception) that is inconsistent with the
persona (i.e., context) he wishes to convey about himself. We sometimes experience this
sense of embarrassment as a sudden sense of disorientation. We say typically "I was just not
myself." Packer's subjects who engaged in deception displayed very little embarrassment




claims to be in some fundamental way. Shame entails the violation of
some general principle of civil conduct. To be a false friend and betray
another is shameful. s9
IV. CLINICAL TEACHING ABOUT DECEPTION
A. The Danger Point in Negotiating
The first step in teaching students how to handle deception is to
alert them to the danger point in negotiating, that is, the point at which
contexts change during a negotiation. As Professor Gifford points out,
60
negotiators frequently use more than one strategy (more than one context)
in a single negotiation. A common contextual sequence in a zero-sum
negotiation, for example, is from competition to cooperation. The
negotiators compete until they become exhausted and call a truce. They
then proceed cooperatively, making sequential, reciprocal concessions.
The most dangerous point in such a negotiation, the point when context
deception is most likely to occur, is the transition point between contexts.
After an hour of competitive bashing, negotiator A makes a gesture of
conciliation consistent with his decision to change the negotiation context
to cooperation. Negotiator B interprets this gesture as just another
competitive gimmick. She pretends to go along with what she perceives
as his continuing competitive game plan and then zaps him with a
deception. Upon his discovery of the deception, he is outraged. She
perceives his outrage as just one more competitive tactic. The viability of
the negotiation is now imperiled.
59. Babcock writes:
In sum, both shame and embarrassment play an important role in
maintaining personal identity. The difference lies in the fact that shame is
focused around the desire to live up to what are taken to be shared
objective standards of what it is to be a worthy person and encourages one
to work towards that ideal, whereas embarrassment is focused around the
desire to live up to a personal and perhaps idiosyncratic standards, i.e., to
act in accordance with one's own conception of self, instead of just
reacting to the immediate demands of the situation. Babcock, supra note
55, at 470.
She observes that Aristotle in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary actions
(NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK IIl) distinguishes ignorance of major premises that produce
immoral acts and deserve reproach from ignorance of particulars that produce only
involuntary acts that are subject to pardon. Babcock finds these distinctions consistent with
shame and embarrassment. I would add they are also consistent with ignorance of context
(major premises) and ignorance of content (particulars). Id. at 468. Packer observes that
Losing Team members broke off playing with Winning Team members because "they see
the Winning Team as unworthy of further play." Packer, supra note 53, at 52 (emphasis in
original). As the game ended, a Losing Team member remarked to a Winning Team
member, "I'm ashamed (of you)." The pertinent dialogue is set forth in Appendix 2, infra.
60. Gifford, supra note 41, at 57-58.
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B. Negotiation Personality Preferences
The second step in helping students handle deception is for them to
learn their own negotiation strategy preferences. Two simple paper-and-
pencil instruments can help students identify their preferences. The first
is the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Management of Differences Exercise
(MODE), a thirty-question, forced-choice, pencil-and-paper instrument
that a student can complete and self-score in ten minutes. 61 The MODE
graphs the student's responses along two poles, competition (concern for
one's own interests) and accommodation (concern for the other's
interests), generating five different negotiation styles: Competition,
Accommodation, Avoidance, Cooperation, and Collaboration (i.e.,
Integration). Over the past five years, about one-third of the students in
my Legal Negotiation course have scored themselves as competitors, and
the remaining two-thirds as cooperators, accommodators, avoiders, 62 or
collaborators. 6
The second instrument is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI),
a ninety-question, forced-choice, pencil-and-paper questionnaire that a
student can self-administer and score in about twenty-five minutes. 64
Among its four scales, the MBTI provides a "thinking/feeling" scale that
sorts subjects who prefer impersonal logic and analysis ("thinkers") from
those who prefer the application of values and the consideration of
personal relationships ("feelers"). Thinkers, as indicated on the MBTI,
correlate significantly with competitors on the MODE, and feelers
correlate with cooperators. 6s  Generally speaking, students who prefer
responding to problems with impersonal logic are more likely to be
comfortable with competition (and presumably deception) and those who
prefer responding with considerations of values and the maintenance of
personal relations are more likely to be comfortable with cooperation and
61. K. THOMAS & R. KILMANN, THOMAS-KILMANN CONFLICT MODE INSTRUMENT
(1974).
62. Collaborators reflect a high score on both accommodation and competition;
cooperators a medium score on both; and avoiders a low score on both. Because "avoider"
sounds unnecessarily pejorative, I use the term "diplomat" in my class.
63. Professor Gerald Williams, based on his empirical study of 2,000 practicing
attorneys in Denver and Phoenix, concludes that about one-fourth of these attorneys are
"competitive." G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15-19 (1983).
64. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Form G Self-Scorable Edition (B) is available
from Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc., Palo Alto, CA. See, I. BRIGGS MYERS & M.
MCCAULLEY, MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE MYERS-BRIGGS
TYPE INDICATOR (1985).
65. Mills, Robey & Smith, Conflict-Handling and Personality Dimensions of Project-
Management Personnel, 57 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1135 (1985). The subjects were 199
project management personnel. S. HARTWELL, R. PACE & R. HUTAK, WOMEN
NEGOTIATING: ASSERTIVENESS AND RELATEDNESS (1991). The subjects were 34
undergraduate students and 34 law students. In both studies the Pearson Correlate between
the "thinking" and "competition" scales ran about .30, p < .05.
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candidness. Students who score consistently across both instruments as
either competitive-thinkers or as cooperative-feelers tend to represent quite
consistent negotiation styles -- what I call "dedicated" styles.
Dedicated cooperators are natural Mullerians. Their reaction to a
predatory world is to join forces with all other like-minded cooperators.
Just as one Mullerian family allies itself with a second Mullerian family in
their mimetic appearance, dedicated "Mullerian" negotiators attempt to
ally themselves with their negotiation opposition. (Note that Mullerian
butterflies may cooperate together against predator birds but compete
against each other for food and shelter. However, in "choosing" a
common appearance, the Mullerian butterflies have attenuated any
competitive advantage a distinct appearance might have afforded them in
competing against each other.) Mullerian negotiators seek to construct a
trusting relationship with their opponents to contend against forces beyond
the immediate negotiation. As recounted in Part I,' dedicated cooperators
convinced the rest of the students in my first Legal Negotiation course to
cooperate in competition against me. I wanted them to compete (when
appropriate) and they did not want to. It is interesting to note that what
appeared as cooperation among the students appeared as collusion to me.
The introduction of the "scoreboard" served as a sufficient incentive to
mobilize the competitors against this collusion. 67
Students who are dedicated Batesian competitors see their best
chance of success as taking advantage of dedicated Mullerian cooperative
largesse. When a dedicated cooperator offers a concession toward
building trust, the dedicated competitor takes it and asks for more. In the
words of the dedicated competitor quoted in Appendix 3, "We think that
since he was this soft, we should reach for a little more."A Dedicated
competitors call this reaching "healthy competition" and dedicated
cooperators call it "unconscionable greed. " 9
66. See note 6 and accompanying text, supra. -
67. Readers conversant with Robert Axelrod's work may recognize here a familiar
scenario. Axelrod describes how cooperation "broke out" between front-line Allied and Axis
soldiers during World War I to the dismay of their commanding generals. Spontaneously,
each side began piecemeal not to fight at certain hours and locations in tit-for-tat fashion
until fighting ceased along whole sections of the line. The commanding generals disrupted
this fragile and spontaneous armistice by insisting that their soldiers fight or face court
martial. Like myself in class, the generals interpreted the armistice not as benign
cooperation but as collusion. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). See
also Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas: Computer Tournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Suggest How Cooperation Evolves, SCI. AM., May, 1983, at 16.
68. See Appendix 3, infra.
69. Some research has found that competitors always compete but that cooperators only
cooperate with fellow cooperators. As a result, competitors tend to see the negotiation
world homogeneously in which everyone competes; cooperators see the same world
heterogeneously in which competitors compete and cooperators cooperate. Kelley &
Stahelski, Social Interaction Basis of Cooperators' and Competitors' Beliefs About Others,
16 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 66, 69, 74 (1970). My own teaching experience
suggests otherwise, at least among dedicated negotiators: Dedicated cooperators nearly
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My teaching experience suggests that while dedicated competitors
easily adapt to cooperation or collaboration, (though they find it less
fun), 70 dedicated accommodators and cooperators do not easily adapt to
competition?' In every class I have taught, there has been a group of
dedicated cooperators who agonize through simulated, zero-sum
competitive negotiations. They often become angry at the deception
employed by their competitive opponents who, like Packer's competitive
Winning Team members, are amused at what they view as the
sanctimonious whining of the naive.72 Although dedicated cooperators
never, in my experience, enjoy competition or deception, some eventually
learn to recognize competition and to adapt their strategy accordingly.
3
The major problem dedicated cooperators encounter is learning to
read context rather than content.7 4 By reading context, I mean the ability
to recognize the negotiation situation as competitive, cooperative, or
integrative from cues apart from what the opponent says. Generally
always resist competition but dedicated competitors will cooperate or collaborate if it is
shown to be in their best interests. Perhaps only in the classroom are competitors given the
opportunity to see the limitations of monotonic competition and therefore change their style.
70. Note the revealing comment in Appendix 2, infra, of the one Winning Team
member in Packer's study, that his team had all of the "fun people."
71. The conduct of the members of the "winning" and "losing" teams described by
Packer (Appendices 1 and 2, infra) are consistent with what I mean by "dedicated
competitors" and "dedicated cooperators," respectively.
72. Packer, supra note 53, at 117. Note the revealing comment of one Losing Team
member in Appendix 2, infra, that "We had all of the moral people on our side."
73. One study comparing undergraduate and law school men and women students found
that law school socialized women students but not men into becoming more assertive
negotiators and therefore more likely as cooperators to adapt to competition. S. HARTWELL,
R. PACE & R. HUTAK, supra note 65.
74. Western people generally and North Americans in particular are more likely than
people from other cultures to attribute conduct to character rather than to context (i.e., the
situation, the circumstances). They are more likely than non-Westerners to believe that a
person deceives, for example, because of his character than because of the circumstances
within which he finds himself. J. FREEDMAN, D. SEARS & J. M. CARLSMITH, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 170-72 (4th ed. 1981). This tendency to attribute conduct to character has
been demonstrated in numerous experiments to lead to an incorrect attribution, that is, that
the subject errs in attributing the conduct to character rather than to the situation. Even
when told, for example, that a speaker has read a controversial speech because she was paid
to do so, Western observers are more likely than others to attribute the controversial views
expressed as reflecting the actual beliefs of the speaker. Id. at 153-55. This error is so
prevalent that it is known among social scientists as "the fundamental error of attribution."
Id. at 153. Many students - and, I suspect, practitioners - fall victim to this "fundamental
error of attribution" in concluding that a negotiator who is truthful in a cooperative context
will also be truthful in a competitive context because they believe he has a "truthful
disposition." An individual's propensity to deceive can better be predicted by circumstances
(context) than by disposition. Such dispositional beliefs, once formed, are difficult to change.
Shewder & Broune, Does the Concept of Person Vary Cross-Culturally?, CULTURAL
CONCEPTS OF MENTAL HEALTH AND THERAPY 97-137 (A.J. Marsella & C. White ed.
1982); Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation, 46 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 961 (1984).
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speaking, all zero-sum 7s negotiations should be understood as potentially
competitive. Dedicated cooperators wish even zero-sum negotiations to be
only cooperative. They grasp at the first cooperative-appearing straw that
blows their way. When an opposing competitive negotiator states that he
is going to proceed cooperatively (like Packer's Winning Team Male
#1),76 the dedicated cooperator mistakenly believes this content (the
statement of cooperation), rather than the context (a competitive zero-sum
negotiation). Typically, competitive negotiators employ a cooperative
strategy only in a zero-sum negotiation when they get desperate.
Dedicated cooperators must learn to wait them out.
Dedicated competitors who negotiate with dedicated cooperators
face a different task. Competitors run the risk of so enraging deceived
cooperators that they will refuse to negotiate further, thereby increasing
everyone's transaction costs. Once again, the problem is a misreading of
context 7  Just as the dedicated cooperator prefers cooperation and
presumes others also do, the dedicated competitor prefers competition and
presumes that others do as well. When a dedicated cooperator responds
in anger to a competitor's deceptive tactic, the competitor reads the anger
as merely a tactic within a competitive strategy.7' Dedicated competitors
also infuriate their opponents by treating all negotiations as if they were
zero-sum. They often fail to take advantage of the extra profit available
to both parties through collaboration in integrative negotiations.
Once either the deceived cooperator or the deceiving competitor
understands what has happened, she needs to take corrective action.
Assuming the competitor wants the negotiation to continue, she needs to
apologize (act "embarrassed") and make a cooperative gesture.79 She
75. A "zero-sum" negotiation - sometimes referred to as "distributive bargaining" - is
one in which one party can gain only at the expense of the other. J. MURRAY, A. RAU, E.
SHERMAN, THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 82 (1989). Some commentators contend
that few real-world negotiations are ever truly "zero-sum" despite the conventional
negotiation literature that assumes "zero-sum" negotiations to be the standard. Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View, supra note 4, at 776.
76. See Appendix 1, infra.
77. A competitor may not want to know that her opponent is in a cooperative strategy
and therefore suppress knowing so unconsciously in order to continue her competitive
tactics. P. ZIMBARDO, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 482-84 (10th ed. 1979).
78. One attribute of emotional immaturity is the belief that others know how one thinks
or feels. Negotiators who are immature are more likely to assume that when they assume a
particular negotiation context (e.g., integration), their opponent will know that. When their
opponent, operating in a different context (e.g., competition), deceives them, they are
especially upset because they believe their opponent knew their intention to negotiate in a
cooperative context.
79. Of course, the apparently outraged "cooperator" just might be a very clever
competitor. Mimetic butterflies are everywhere and the cleverest bird sometimes gets
fooled.
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must understand that the outraged cooperator may have interpreted her
competitive ploy as a shamefully immoral act."°
The outraged cooperator has the more difficult task of convincing
the competitor that the cooperator has reasonably interpreted the
competitor's conduct as a contextual statement promising cooperation.
The obvious problem is that the competitor will interpret the cooperator's
outrage as merely a competitor's ploy. Hence, the cooperator has to
make a very strong "context statement." That is, the cooperator has to do
something that clearly signals that his outrage is about the deception of
context and not about a deception within a context of competition.
Because context cues come primarily from the environment surrounding
the dialogue, the cooperator needs to change the environment
dramatically. One way to change the environment is to refuse to continue
negotiating. 1 I believe that it is sometimes more effective to break the
negotiation entirely and to stage a walk-out. I instruct students in my
Legal Negotiation course who perceive themselves as dedicated
cooperators to walk out at least once during the semester. Many who do
engineer a walk-out report a sense of liberation.8'
I think that shaming tactics against deceptive competitors are rarely
effective. Many negotiators are willing to accept embarrassment but not
the odium of shame. The deceived cooperator might better treat the
deception as merely a slip in role (e.g., "Look I thought we had reached a
cooperative stage, but I hear your last statement as hard-ball. I cannot
80. Anger prevents people from thinking rationally. "Emotional arousal, such as
extreme anger, may prevent the individual from pausing and performing a detailed analysis
(and therefore make a primitive attribution of fault)." Rose & Ditecco, An Attributional
Analysis of Moral Judgments, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 91-109 (1975). The incapacity of
negotiators who have made emotionally charged decisions to think rationally is discussed in
Hartwell, Mediation in Resolving Legal Disputes: Secret is Best, J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES (in press) (1990).
81. The deceived cooperators in Packer's study tried just this tactic: "The Losing Team
members folded their arms across their chests and refuse to continue." See Appendix 1 text
accompanying note 96, infra.
82. Fisher and Ury offer a wholly different strategy for cooperators (and collaborators)
to employ against competitors who resort to "dirty tricks" such as deception. They caution
cooperators not to get angry as they may lose control of the negotiation. FISHER & URY,
GETTING To YES 126 (1981). They advise cooperators who have been deceived to express
personal support for their opponent (so as to depersonalize the deception), express their
desire that the dispute be settled fairly on the basis of principle, and then qualify their
challenge to the deception (e.g., "Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I understood you to
say . . ."). Id. at 122-26. William McCarthy criticizes this approach as unrealistic and
perhaps directed at bolstering the confidence of unaggressive negotiators. McCarthy, The
Role of Power and Principle in "Getting to Yes," I NEGOTIATION J. 59 (1985). James J.
White takes a different tack in criticizing Fisher & Ury's treatment of such "dirty tricks" as
deception. White thinks that they treat deception simplistically leading to a self-righteous




negotiate with you if I don't know what you are doing. I need to call my
office anyway, so let's take a break.") '
Sometimes students think the ideal way to learn to negotiate is as
mimetic butterflies and predator birds. They believe that if they could
just learn to negotiate unemotionally they would be unbeatable. What
they are describing are the psychopathic negotiating tactics of Stalin. We
are all born with an affective processing system, a system that helps
define our humanity. Emotions such as anger, outrage, and disgust are
sometimes referred to as "moral emotions" because they are the initial,
and probably necessary, response to socially unacceptable conduct. 4
Hence, the cooperator's outrage is the human and typically appropriate
response to a deception of context. Our failure to express outrage
appropriately serves as operant conditioning to encourage others to
deceive us.8s
Some cooperators have been socialized into behaving in a manner
similar to neurotic dogs. These students have lost the capacity to deal
with ambiguity. It is as if they have learned a "discrimination required/no
mistake" context in school. They demand answers where none are
forthcoming. 6  I am concerned that one of the adverse effects of
traditional legal education -- a concern expressed by some traditional legal
educators -- is that it teaches students that mistakes are unacceptable.
Like the poor dog strapped to a laboratory cot, some students learn in law
school (if not earlier) a context in which only a correct answer is an
acceptable answer.Y When these students, particularly if they are
dedicated cooperators, face a vigorous competitor, they cannot accept the
83. Of course, this recommendation requires the cooperator to deceive by failing to
state his true feelings. Some dedicated cooperators believe that disguising their feelings is
wrong and make no effort to modulate their anger. Sometimes it helps dedicated
cooperators to understand that the perception of embarrassment and shame vary significantly
between actors and observers. For example, I may feel embarrassed when a waiter spills
soup on me (though I am totally not at fault) and the waiter may feel ashamed (though he
did not intend the spill) but an observer may believe that the waiter is only embarrassed and
I am neither embarrassed nor ashamed but angry. Babcock, supra note 55, at 462-63.
84. Packer, supra note 53, at 136.
85. The failure of the deceived student negotiator, as set forth in Appendix 3, infra to
express his anger encouraged his opposition to continue its deception. The anthropologist
Gregory Bateson referred to this kind of interaction in which the negative conduct of one
party encourages the negative conduct of another as "schismogenesis," a quite elegant term
for what is more commonly called a "vicious circle." BATESON, supra note 30, at 104-9.
86. Some family-system theorists refer to this demand as the "utopia syndrome."
Watzlawick, supra note 8, at 47-61.
87. E.g., Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REV. 135,
145 (1987), writes, "The ideal of legal expertise ... is the general belief ... shared by . .
. most law professors ... that any lawyer (or any incipient lawyer) who is any good will be
able to provide the right answer to legal problems with relative quickness, with great
precision, and (most importantly) without making mistakes." (emphasis in original)
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fact that they will not know whether they are being deceived." Like the
neurotic dog, they have lost their natural capacity to make a guess.
V. CONCLUSION
The functionalist approach as taken in this Article to the ethics of
deception may be more useful in shaping ethical conduct than more
traditional normative approaches. The weakness with any normative
approach in positively influencing conduct is that many students reject
norms as contrary to their own best interests. While growing up, none of
us ever really believed that we were being spanked for our own good.
The immediate reaction of many students to an ethical norm that says they
should not deceive during a negotiation is a suspicion that this norm will
disadvantage their negotiation success. I cannot disagree with their
assessment. Certainly, a negotiator who is totally incapable of deception
operates at a sizable disadvantage.5 ' Further, students perceive norms that
permit some deceptions (e.g., "puffing opinions") but reject others (e.g.,
"distorting facts") as illogical compromises justified only by custom and
practice. 9'
Even when students accept normative ethics, their usefulness for
negotiators is highly problematic. What counts as deception among some
sections of the bar does not count as deception elsewhere. For example,
in criminal law practice where much plea bargaining takes place quickly
over the phone or in the courthouse hallway between practitioners who
deal with each other every day, much less deception occurs than between
civil practitioners who deal with each other only on occasion. 9 For many
of these civil practitioners, nothing is fixed until it is in writing. In
addition, what counts as deception differs between localities. What may
count as deception among practitioners in Modoc County, California, may
88. In the real world, negotiators may often not know they have been deceived,
especially in non-iterated situations. Peters, supra note 1, at 44. Researchers have found
that deception (i.e., telling lies) is very difficult to detect. Cody & O'Hair, Nonverbal
Communications and Deception: Differences in Deception Cues Due to Gender and
Communicator Dominance, 50 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 175 (1983).
89. In class, I refer to this inability to deceive as the "Billy Budd Syndrome," from
Herman Melville's famous novella. As readers may recall, honest Billy, falsely accused of
mutiny, kills his accuser in frustration when he is unable to speak because of a stammer.
See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988) and White,
What Can A Lawyer Learn From Literature, 102 HARV. L. REv. 2014, 2038-42 (1989) for
an engaging debate over the meaning of Billy Budd to the legal community.
90. I agree with Professor Peters that, except at the margins, trying to establish ethical
norms that efficiently distinguish between acceptable "deception" and unacceptable "lies" is a
hopeless task. See Peters, supra note I, at 8-20, 37-40.




not count as deception in Los Angeles. Normative ethics cannot account
easily for these differences in practice or locality. -
In contrast, a functionalist approach focuses attention on the goals
of the negotiation, on what the negotiators are trying to achieve. Students
learn very quickly that certain deceptions in cooperative or collaborative
negotiations are dysfunctional.n They learn to be candid (within limits) in
these situations because candidness works." They also learn not to trust
strangers in competitive situations however often the stranger may say
"trust me." Like predator birds trying to decide whether the mimetic is
Mullerian or Batesian, they learn to gauge how hungry they really are and
where the next meal may be.
In my experience, students find the notion of shame a practical
guide to negotiation deception. They are more likely to agree as to what
constitutes shameful deception than they are unethical deception and more
likely to refrain from conduct they believe to be shameful than conduct
that they believe to be (merely) unethical. 9'
APPENDIX 1
Packer's Study of Deception and Context. Packer observed
students as they negotiated the well-known "Prisoner's Dilemma" game.'
In Packer's version, the game is played between two teams of four
students each.6 The scoring system enables one team to gain an
92. Highly competitive students in my Legal Negotiation course do not score as well as
cooperative and collaborative students in negotiating simulated cooperative or collaborative
problems. Competitors more often fail to find the mutually profitable solutions cooperators
and collaborators find. The students (and 1) assume these simulations replicate real-life
negotiations. The paucity of cooperative or collaborative negotiation problems available to
clinicians has often been lamented. Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiations, supra note 4, at
931-36.
93. Candidness "within limits" because all negotiations contain some zero-sum aspects
that provide incentives to deceive. Peters, supra note 1, at 30, 36, 40.
94. Many years ago, Jerome Frank deftly caught the difference between shame and
mere legality in promoting social control: "Most men are less likely to offend social
proprieties than to violate legal rules, less likely, for example, publicly to appear clad only
in underwear than to commit theft." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 12 (1950).
95. The structure and ethics of the Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed in H. RAIFFA,
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 344-45 (1982); For a history of the Dilemma, see
Sommer, The District Attorney's Dilemma: Experimental Games and the Real World of Plea
Bargaining, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 526 (1982).
96. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma was based on the dilemma of two suspects who
have been taken into custody and isolated in separate cells. The district attorney already has
enough evidence to convict both on a misdemeanor but needs the confession of either suspect
to convict both on a serious felony. Each suspect can either confess or remain silent. If each
suspect remains silent, then each will be convicted on the misdemeanor and serve six months
in jail. If each confesses, then each will serve two years. But if one confesses and the other
remains silent, then the one who confesses gets one year and the other will get four years.
The prisoners are obviously both best off with cooperative silence. However, a prisoner who
remains silent faces a dilemma: if his partner confesses, then he faces a maximum term; yet
if he confesses and his partner remains silent, he has blown his chance for the minimum
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advantage over the other team through calculated deception. The usual
ruse is for one team to convince the other team to play "cooperatively" (in
which both teams play blue cards and score at a moderate rate), though
the first team has already secretly determined to play "competitively"
(wherein the first team in playing a white card scores spectacularly if and
only if the second team is duped into playing a "cooperative" blue card).
How the Game Proceeded. The players in Packer's study were all
friends or acquaintances who attended the same college and lived near
each other on campus. They played for token stakes only. They had all
volunteered to play the game and had consented to video-taping.' The
following transcribed dialogue begins with the reactions of several
members of the "cooperative" losing team when they realize that the
opposing "competitive" winning team has deceived them into believing
that they, members of the winning team, were also going to play
"cooperatively." Included within parentheses () are Packer's observations
and within brackets [ ] my additions.
Losing Team Male #1: Hey, what's going on here? I mean this is
. . . (He says this very quietly, almost to himself) . . . I don't believe it!
(He looks up, mouth open. Laughter from the Winning Team. This time
each of them plays a white card [that is, a competitive card].) I don't
believe it! . . . Wait! Let the record show that I'm outraged. (He grabs
the microphone which hangs over the table to say this. Laughter from
members of the Winning Team.) Oh my God!
[Several minutes later] Staff person: Okay? Do you want to go
another round? Ready?
Winning Team Male #1: I think we better negotiate before we get
screwed.
Losing Team Male #1: Negotiate? Again? (His sense is "no way")
Shit on you guys.
Losing Team Female #1: (She makes a gesture, palms down,
hands moved laterally -- a "cut" gesture -- to her teammates.)
Losing Team Male #1: I don't believe it.
Staff Person: The Winning Team wants to negotiate, does the
Losing Team?
Losing Team Female #2: No more, no more.
term. No logical strategy resolves the dilemma. Packer, supra note 53, at 22-24.
Packer's version retains the basic theme of the original Prisoner's Dilemma but
expands the two-person game to two teams of players, adds a scoring system combining
individual decisions and team decisions and provides for cumulative scoring over a number
of rounds. Most importantly, the two teams can each select a leader to negotiate strategy in
full view of all of the team members so that the focus of interest is now the dialogue among
the team members rather than the scoring decisions. Id. at 24-26.
97. Id. at 26.
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Losing Team Female #1: We don't trust them anymore.
Losing Team Female #2: We're not playing anymore.
Packer observes: "The Losing Team now lay their cards
down ... and refuse to continue to actively engage in the game ... They
sit like this for the remainder of the round, with folded arms, and at the
end of the round they again refuse to negotiate.""
Interpreting the Reaction of the Losing Team Members. This
excerpt captures the powerful feelings that typically accompany the
discovery of a deception of context. The Losing Team members believed
that the agreed-to negotiation context was "cooperation," a context which
does not permit the kind of deception perpetrated by the Winning Team.
What angers the Losing Team members is not just a deception of content
(playing competitive white cards after promising to play cooperative blue
cards), but the deception of context within which the false statements were
made. The Winning Team had deceived the Losing Team not merely into
believing that the Winning Team intended to play blue cards, but, more
significantly, into believing that the Winning Team understood the
negotiation process as cooperative. This excerpt only hints at the depth of
the anger of the Losing Team which is caught more fully in reading
Packer's study in its entirety.
Deception within a Competitive Context. In some instances, Teams
made no specific agreement to cooperate. In these instances, the context
was tacitly assumed to be competitive. When cheating occurred, Packer
reported in one typical case that there was "some joking and teasing about
this, but no one is genuinely upset; after all, they have arranged that the
'cheating' take place."9'
APPENDIX 2
After the Losing Team broke off the negotiation, as related in
Appendix 1, the two teams appeared to patch up their differences and
negotiated an agreement to continue. As part of the agreement, the
Winning Team intentionally lost points so that the Losing Team could
catch up. After eight rounds of cooperative moves, the Winning Team
again began without warning to make competitive moves. This time the
Losing Team retaliated with competitive moves so that neither team could
98. Id. at 50-52.
99. Id. at 37.
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score. Once again, members of the Winning Team entreated Losing
Team members to agree to cooperative moves.' °
Initially, the Losing Team refused the entreaty. In the dialogue
that follows, a Winning Team negotiator offers a strategy to help the
Losing Team catch up. He says, "Okay, see we just realized that,
anyway, burning [i.e., deception] doesn't do us any good.... We didn't
realize that we would have more points there." Losing Team Male #1 is
offended and responds in an astonished tone, "What do you mean, you
didn't realize. You burnt us, when we had an agreement, and you didn't
hold up your end of the bargain." Packer observes that the Winning Team
misunderstands the upset reaction of the Losing Team. The Winning
Team believes that the Losing Team is upset (merely) because the Losing
Team lost points. Hence, from the Winning Team's point of view, a
strategy that will help the Losing Team score points should heal the upset.
Packer concludes that the Winning Team sees the impasse as a strategy
question and the Losing Team sees it as a value question.'0 '
After another series of cooperative moves, the Winning Team
again returned to competitive moves just before the round came to an end.
Once again, Losing Team Male #1 is flabbergasted, "I don't believe it."
Losing Team Female #1 adds, "It's really, it's really cheap of you guys."
Winning Team Male #1 responds most revealingly, "So what, it's only a
game." His remark indicates to me that he understands the negotiation as
a game with only one possible context, that of competition. Losing Team
Female #1 responds, "It really was ... I'm, I'm ashamed (of you)." As
the game ends, Losing Team Male #2 concludes, "We had all of the
moral people on our side" to which Winning Team Male #1 responds,
"And all the fun people on the other side. 02 Losing Team members judge
the Winning Team's deception of context as shameful, a judgment the
Winning Team rejects.
APPENDIX 3
The Reaction of Anger. Among negotiators, especially naive
negotiators like Packer's Losing Team members, context deception often
engenders intense anger. Sometimes negotiators attempt to conceal the
anger, as in the excerpt that follows. The participants here were two
teams of three students each who negotiated a simulated problem in my
Legal Negotiation course. The negotiation was conducted in front of a
class of twenty-four students and was video-taped with the consent of the
100. Id. at 50-52.
101. Id. at 127-34.
102. Id. at 103-4.
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participants. The negotiation had progressed about twenty minutes before
it became obvious that the Winning Team had feigned cooperation to the,
Losing Team while deceiving them on several key facts. The instructor's
observations are within parentheses (); a series of periods [...] indicates a
pause.
Instructor: Let's stop here for a minute.
Winning Team Member #1: Let's not. I thought he (gesturing
toward Losing Team Member #1) was doing fine. (Winning Team
Member #1 laughs.)
Winning Team Member #2: We think that since he was this soft,
we should reach for a little more. (Winning Team Member #2 laughs
with Winning Team Member #1.)
Losing Team Member #1: (He says nothing and sits iarms folded
across his chest.)
Instructor to Losing Team Member #1: How do you read what
just happened?
Losing Team Member #1: I just avoided it. I just did not listen
to what they were saying.
Instructor: I understand that, but did you read his last comments
to you as condescending?
Losing Team Member #1: Inside I was upset ... but I thought ...
I'd just plod along ... and that he could not be that antagonistic ... I mean
he could be, but I did not think he would.
Instructor: Did you feel it anywhere physically?
Losing Team Member #1: Sure, I was angry.
Instructor: Where did you feel your anger?
Losing Team Member #1: Well, I ... (his voice trails off and he
is silent).
Instructor: (turning toward the class) Sometimes I feel anger
here ... (putting his hand on his stomach).
Losing Team Member #1: (interrupting instructor) In this right
hand! (He raises and shakes his right fist.)
Instructor: You feel anger in your hands.
Losing Team Member #1: No, no ... I was angry ... but I
disregarded it.1n
Like the Losing Team members in Packer's study, these Losing
Team members refused to negotiate further. The critical deceptions i:i
both instances were deceptions of context, in which members of ne
negotiating team deceived members of the other negotiating team that they
103. From the author's class notes. This student, in my opinion, has been disabled like
the laboratory dog from responding effectively to the deception. See text accompanying note
29, supra. I believe the moral and efficient response to context deception is anger. See
Hartwell, Psychology, Anger and Clinical Teaching (on file with the author).
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intended a context of cooperation while in fact intending a context of
competition. In both instances the discovery of the deception created
intense anger which, in the second case, the deceived player tried to hide.
